Assault and Battery - Civil Liability - Whether or Not Fact of Actual Consent by Minor to a Surgical Operation May Be Used to Avoid Liability or Be Considered for Purpose of Mitigating Damage by Edmondson, J. E.
Chicago-Kent Law Review
Volume 35 | Issue 2 Article 4
April 1957
Assault and Battery - Civil Liability - Whether or
Not Fact of Actual Consent by Minor to a Surgical
Operation May Be Used to Avoid Liability or Be
Considered for Purpose of Mitigating Damage
J. E. Edmondson
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact
dginsberg@kentlaw.iit.edu.
Recommended Citation
J. E. Edmondson, Assault and Battery - Civil Liability - Whether or Not Fact of Actual Consent by Minor to a Surgical Operation May Be
Used to Avoid Liability or Be Considered for Purpose of Mitigating Damage, 35 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 128 (1957).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol35/iss2/4
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
Punms-ia DECEMBER, MARCH, JUNE AND SEPTEMBER nY THE STUDENTS OF
CHICAGO-KENT COLLEGE OF LAW, 10 N. FRANKLIN ST., CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
Subscription price, $3.00 per year Single copies, $1.00 Foreign subscription, $3.50
EDITORIAL BOARD
Editor-in-Chief
C. F. ANDERSON
Associate Editor
D. H. NIEDERE
STAFF
D. C. FALLS G. MAGAVERO
Case Editors
J. E. EDMONDSON C. R. PARKER H. R. WINTON, JR.
W. R. IMPLY D. SCHULTZ N. A. ZIMMERMAN
J. R. KLPoFm D. E. WILLSON S. P. ZISOOK
BOARD OF MANAGERS
J. K. MARSHAjL, Chairman and Faculty Adviser
KATHERINE D. AGAR, DONALD CAMPBELL, JAMES R. HEMINGWAY, W. F. ZAOHARIAa
The College assumes no responsibility for any statement
appearing in the columns of the REvIgw
VOLUME 35 SPRING, 1957 NUMBER 2
DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
ASSAULT AND BATTERY-CIVIL LIABILITY-WHETHER OR NOT FACT OF
ACTUAL CONSENT BY MINOR TO A SURGICAL OPERATION MAY BE USED TO
Avom LIALITy OR BE CONSIDERED FOR PURPOSE OF MITIGATING DAMAGE--
A sharp division on the part of the judges of the Supreme Court of Ohio
developed over the recent case of Lacey v. Laird' wherein the defendant
1166 Ohio St. 12, 139 N. E. (2d) 25 (1956). An unreported decision of the Ohio
Court of Appeals, which reversed a trial court judgment in favor of the plaintiff,
was there upheld in a per curiam opinion. Four judges, including Taft, J., who
wrote a concurring opinion in support of the syllabus prepared by the court, were
of the opinion that the consent was a completely effective one. Three judges, includ-
ing Hart, J., who wrote what was designated as a concurring opinion because of
agreement in the reversal of the judgment, criticized the holding in relation to the
attributes to be given to such consent.
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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
surgeon had reshaped the nose of the eighteen-year old female plaintiff2
by means of plastic surgery with her consent but without the consent of
her parents and without making any attempt to communicate with them.
After an apparently successful operation, the minor brought suit against
the surgeon charging a civil assault and battery. Upon the trial thereof,
the trial judge rejected the defendant's offer of evidence to the effect that
the operation was performed with the actual consent of the minor, declar-
ing it to be the general rule that a minor, in the absence of an emergency,
had no power to consent to an operation but did respond to an inquiry on
the part of the jury by saying that if it found the defendent guilty of no
more than a technical assault it might limit the recovery to nominal dam-
ages.4 The Ohio Court of Appeals, without written opinion, reversed for
error in the rejection of the testimony as to the plaintiff's consent and in
charging that an eighteen-year old minor could not consent to a simple
operation as well as for error in treating the case as one for technical
battery and for incorrectly defining nominal damages. Plaintiff's motion
to certify the record having been allowed, the Supreme Court of Ohio
affirmed the holding of the Court of Appeals when a majority of the
judges concluded that a minor of the age of plaintiff could effectively con-
sent to a simple surgical operation. The dissident judges were willing to
concede that evidence of such consent should have been admitted but would
have limited the effect thereof to a mitigating circumstance in relation to
the proper measure of damage.
The tort charged by the plaintiff, that of civil assault and battery, has
long been recognized as being present in the event there is the least touch-
ing of the body of another against his will, 5 hence is one which may be
committed by a physician or surgeon as well as by any other person. The
general rule in that respect seems well established for, as Judge Cardozo
2 Under Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 1954, § 3109.1, all persons of the age of twenty-one
years or more, who are under no legal disability, are deemed capable of contracting
and of full age for all purposes.
S According to the case of Canterbury v. Pennsylvania Railway Co., 158 Ohio St.
68, 107 N. E. (2d) 115 (1952), an infant, as a procedural matter, should sue by a
guardian or next friend but if the infant sues in his or her own name and no
attack for lack of capacity is made, the lack of capacity is to be deemed as waived.
4 When defining nominal damages, the trial judge said the damages might be
"simply damages in name" or might range from there up to the amount claimed in
the prayer of the petition. See 166 Ohio St. 12 at 21, 139 N. E. (2d) 25 at 31. Hart,J., in a concurring opinion agreed that, on the basis of the holding in First Nat.
Bank of Barnesville v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 30 Ohio St. 555, 27 Am.
Dec. 485 (1876), this was manifest error requiring reversal since nominal damages
could never exceed "some small sum of money . .. as $1," hence may have misled
the jury into a verdict for plaintiff In the sum of $3,500.00.
5 Clayton v. New Dreamland Roller Skating Rink, 14 N. J. Super. 390, 82 A.
(2d) 458 (1951).
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observed in the case of Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospitals,6
every human being of adult years and sound mind "has a right to deter-
mine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs
an operation without his patient's consent commits an assault and battery
for which he is liable in damages . . . This is true, except in cases of emer-
gency where the patient is unconscious, and where it is necessary to
operate before consent can be obtained.' '7 There would seem to be no dis-
agreement among the cases that consent in some form must be present' to
authorize a physician to perform a surgical operation on the body of the
patient.9
Express consent is usually given for a specific operation but consent
to one operation is not consent to a second, l0 even one beneficial to the
patient," hence an operation on the right leg of a patient who had con-
sented to an operation on the left leg would be an assault and battery.12
Authorization for a minor operation does not ordinarily justify the per-
formance of a major operation which involves risks of a kind not contem-
plated,' 3 and consent to perform an operation is not valid if obtained by
representations which are known by the surgeon to be false.14 The patient's
consent, therefore, must be obtained for an operation substantially the
same as that which is performed. 5
Consent to an operation may be found present where a very broad
assent is given the physician to remedy a condition 6 or to do whatever is
6211 N. Y. 125, 105 N. E. 92, Ann. Cas. 1915C 581, 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 505 (1914).
7 211 N. Y. 125 at 129, 105 N. E. 92 at 93.
8 Wall v. Brim, 138 F. (2d) 478 (1943); Markart v. Zeimer, 67 Cal. App. 363,
227 P. 683 (1924) ; Pratt v. Davis, 224 Ill. 300, 79 N. E. 562, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 609(1906) ; Francis v. Brooks, 24 Ohio App. 136, 156 N. E. 609 (1926) ; Thorne v.
Wandell, 176 Wis. 97, 186 N. W. 146 (1922). See also annotation in 76 A. L. R. 562.
9 Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N. W. 12, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 439, 111 Am.
St. Rep. 462, 5 Ann. Cas. 303 (1905) ; Rolater v. Strain, 39 Okla. 572, 137 P. 96,
50 L. R. A. (N. S.) 880 (1913).
10 Pratt v. Davis, 224 Ill. 300, 79 N. E. 562, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 609, 8 Ann. Cas. 197
(1906) ; Hively v. Higgs, 120 Ore. 588, 253 P. 363, 53 A. L. R. 1052 (1927). But see
Russell v. Jackson, 37 Wash. (2d) 66, 221 P. (2d) 516 (1950), where a surgeon
testified that if a cyst is discovered on an ovary during the course of an opera-
tion it Is general practice to remove it, and such removal was said not to be
beyond the operation which he had been directed to perform.
11 Church v. Adler, 350 Ill. App. 471, 113 N. H. (2d) 327 (1953).
12 Jones v. Peterson, 44 Ore. 161, 74 P. 661 (1903).
13 Pratt v. Davis, 224 Ill. 300, 79 N. E. 562, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 609, 8 Ann. Cas.
197 (1906); State for use of Janney v. Housekeeper, 70 Md. 162, 16 A. 382, 2
L. R. A. 587, 14 Am. St. Rep. 340 (1889).
14 Birnbaum v. Siegler, 273 App. Div. 817, 76 N. Y. S. (2d) 173 (1948).
15 Dicenzo v. Berg, 340 Pa. 305, 16 A. (2d) 15 (1940).
16 McClallen v. Adams, 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 333, 31 Am. Dec. 140 (1837) ; Rothe
v. Hull, 352 Mo. 926, 180 S. W. (2d) 7 (1944) ; King v. Carney, 85 Okla. 62, 204 P.
270 (1922).
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necessary to give relief. 17 Thus a patient who consults a surgeon and vol-
untarily submits himself for treatment relying entirely on the surgeon's
skill and care to decide for him what ought to be done gives a general
consent, by implication at least, to such an operation as may, in the sur-
geon's skill and professional judgment, be deemed reasonably necessary.' 8
The generality of the rule mentioned also recognizes that it may not
always be possible to secure the express consent of the patient hence, under
proper circumstances, the consent of the patient may be implied or pre-
sumed. 19 In an emergency and where the patient is unconscious, it may be
necessary to operate before consent can be obtained 20 so, confronted with
an immediate need for the preservation of the life or the health of the
patient and it being clearly impracticable to obtain a consent to an opera-
tion which the surgeon deems immediately necessary, the latter must do
what the occasion demands within the usual and customary practice among
physicians and surgeons in the same or similar localities. While so acting,
he may be justified in extending an operation and removing or overcoming
conditions without express consent. 2' Thus, in major internal operations
where both patient and surgeon know that the exact condition of the pa-
tient cannot be finally and definitely diagnosed until after the patient
is completely anaesthetized and the incision has been made, in the absence
of proof to the contrary, the consent will be construed as being one
of general nature and the surgeon may extend the operation to remedy
any abnormal or diseased condition in the area of the original incision
whenever he, in the exercise of sound professional judgment, determines
that correct surgical procedure dictates and requires such extension.
22
Turning particularly to the matter of performing surgical and similar
operations on children, most of the cases declare that the consent of at least
one of the parents is necessary 23 but there is some indication that, in an
emergency, a surgeon may operate on a child without waiting for authority
17 McClees v. Cohen, 158 Md. 60, 148 A. 124 (1930).
18 Pratt v. Davis, 224 I. 300. 79 N. E. 562 (1906) : Hively v. liggs, 120 Ore. 588,
253 P. 363, 53 A. L. R. 1052 (1927) ; Nolan v. Kechijian, 75 R. I. 165, 64 A. (2d)
866 (1949).
19 Barfield v. South Highland Infirmary, 191 Ala. 553, 68 So. 30, Ann. Cas. 19160
1097 (1915). In Mohr v. Williams. 95 Minn, 261, 104 N. W. 12, 1. L. R. A. (N. S.)
439, 111 Am. St. Rep. 462, 5 Ann. Cas. 303 (1905), the court recognized but refused
to apply the rule.
20 Tabor v. Scobee,-Ky.-, 254 S. W. (2d) 474 (1951), noted in 32 CHicAGO-KENT
LAW REvIEw 152.
21 Wheeler v. Barker, 92 Cal. App. (2d) 776, 208 P. (2d) 68 (1949).
22 Kennedy v. Parrot, 243 N. C. 355, 90 S. E. (2d) 754 (1956). See also Restate-
ment, Torts, § 62, illustration 5, and note in 34 N. Car. L. Rev. 581.
23 Zosky v. Gaines. 271 Mich. 1, 260 N. W. 99 (1935) ; In re Vasko, 238 App. Div.
128, 263 N. Y. S. 552 (1933); Moss v. Rishworth, 222 S. W. 225 (Tex. Civ. App.,
1920) ; Browning v. Hoffman, 90 W. Va. 568, 111 S. E. 492 (1922).
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from the parents or from a person standing in loco parentis when it ap-
pears (1) to be impracticable to secure consent, (2) the operation on the
child appears to be necessary to the surgeon without prolonged delay, and
(3) reasonable and diligent effort on the part of the surgeon to find the
parents of the child and to advise them of the situation has been made.
24
If the surgeon purports to rely on an express consent from the minor
he might be protected by the fact that the minor has been expressly eman-
cipated 25 or is married 26 but, prior to the instant holding, only two Mich-
igan cases had held that the consent of the unemancipated minor would be
sufficient to permit a surgeon to operate without incurring liability.2 7 By
contrast, a majority of the courts dealing with the problem have held that
a minor may not consent to a surgical operation in such a manner as to
relieve the surgeon of the consequences of at least a technical assault and
battery, 28 particularly so where the operation was not one for the benefit
of the minor but in favor of a third person, even though a close relative. 29
24 Jackovach v. Yocom, 212 Iowa 914, 237 N. W. 444, 16 A- L. R. 551 (1931);
Luke v. Lowrie, 171 Mich. 122, 136 N. W. 1106 (1912) ; Tabor v. Scobee,-Ky.-,
254 S. W. (2d) 474 (1951).
25 Mark v. McElroy, 67 Miss. 545, 7 So. 408 (1890).
26 Grayson v. Lofland, 21 Tex. Civ. App. 503, 52 S. W. 121 (1899).
27 See the cases of Bakker v. Welsh, 144 Mich. 632, 108 N. W. 94, 7 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 612 (1906), where a boy seventeen years of age, accompanied by his
parents, who were not asked to consent, submitted to the administration of an
anaesthetic prior to a minor operation and died and where there was no indication
or evidence that consent would not have been given if asked, and Bishop v. Shurly,
237 Mich. 76, 211 N. W. 75 (1926), where a nineteen-year old infant was said to
be able to give a valid consent to a surgical operation on his person on the theory the
operation fell into the category of "necessaries," for which the minor could become
bound. Restatement, Torts, § 59, note 1, supports this view, indicating that if the
child is capable of appreciating the nature, extent and consequences of the invasion,
his assent prevents liability even though the assent of the parent is not obtained
or is expressly refused.
28 Pratt v. Davis, 224 Ill. 300, 79 N. E. 562, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 609, 8 Ann. Cas.
197 (1906) ; Tabor v. Scobee,-Ky.-, 254 S. W. (2d) 474 (1951) ; Mohr v. Williams,
95 Minn. 261, 104 N. W. 12, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 439 (1905) ; Browning v. Hoffman,
90 W. Va. 568, 111 S. E. 492 (1922). For other cases involving infants much
younger than the eighteen-year old plaintiff in the instant case, see Zoski v. Gaines,
271 Mich. 1, 260 N. W. 99 (1935), where the child was only 9 years and 6 months
old; Roger v. Sells, 178 Okla. 103, 61 P. (2d) 1018 (1936), child was 14; Moss v.
Rishworth, 222 S. W. 225 (Tex. Civ. App., 1920), the child involved was 11; and
In re Hudson, 13 Wash. (2d) 673, 126 P. (2d) 765 (1942), where the child was 12.
29 In Bonner v. Moran, 126 F. (2d) 121 (1942), noted in 20 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REVIEW 357 and 30 Geo. L. Journ. 477, a fifteen-year old minor, in the absence of his
parents, consented to a skingrafting operation to aid a near relative. Time
Magazine, Vol. 69, No. 25, p. 80, reports an instance wherein one twin brother,
aged 19, was asked to participate in a kidney transplant operation to aid his dying
twin brother. The surgeons, fearful that not even the surviving parent could give
legal consent thereto, caused a suit to be conducted against themselves as defend-
ants on behalf of the two boys as plaintiffs to secure a court ruling on the point.
The judge is reported as saying that the healthy twin's future well-being would be
more benefited than not by thus helping his brother, so he allowed the doctors to
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The reasoning offered by the majority of the judges of the Supreme
Court of Ohio, at the time of upholding the validity of the consent actually
given by the minor, proceeded along the line that capacity to consent was
not the equivalent of capacity to contract, a matter usually regulated by
statute, but more nearly equated with such things as capacity to commit
a tort or a crime,3 0 to assume a risk,3 1 or to give permission to the doing
of an act which, without such permission, would have amounted to a
criminal offense against the minor.82 Except where these analogies rest
upon a statutory foundation, however, there is reason to doubt the validity
of the underlying premise for the problem then becomes one of fact open
to differing conclusions under differing circumstances. Simplicity in law
is, to say the least, enhanced by a uniform rule such as the one which
makes the age of the child the controlling factor.
An entirely different argument was offered by the minority judges.
They deemed it to be a matter for parental judgment on the premise that
the rule is not one with respect to the minor's capacity to consent but
springs from the parental liability for support and maintenance which
may be greatly increased by an unfavorable result stemming from a sur-
gical operation. Since the parents would be responsible for the nurture
and training of the minor, they were said to be entitled to a corresponding
supervision and control with which strangers should not be permitted to
interfere. Nevertheless, to avoid a possible harsh result, the minority was
willing to consider the purported consent as having a bearing on the mat-
ter of damages believing, with Lord Mansfield, that an infant's privilege
is "given as a shield and not as a sword.' '33 That view tends to coincide
with the thought that in a case where a minor has falsified his or her age
when entering into a contract such fact may be considered either as ground
proceed "without incurring any civil liability." For a case in which only the
minor's interest was at stake and the parents had refused to give consent, see
People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N. E. (2d) 769 (1952). The
court there acted to appoint a guardian who, following appointment, gave the de-
sired consent on behalf of the ward.
30 As to an infant's liability for tort, see Horton v. Wylie, 115 Wis. 505, 92 N. W.
245, 95 Am. St. Rep. 953 (1902). For a general statement of a minor's capacity to
commit a crime, see 27 Am. Jur., Infants, § 97 et seq.
31 In Centrello v. Basky, 164 Ohio St. 41, 128 N. E. (2d) 80 (1955). the court
held that the question as to whether or not a ten-year old plaintiff had assumed
the risk of tortious injury was one which should be left to the jury.
32 The court cited Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 1954, § 12414, as an illustration of the
familiar fact that a female child, over the statutory age, can prevent the taking of
sexual liberties with her person from being rape merely by consenting thereto.
83 Zouch ex dem. Abbot v. Parsons, 3 Burr. 1794 at 1802, 9 Eng. Rep. 1103 at
1107, 1765). See also Harris v. Collins, 75 Ga. 97 (1885), to the effect that the law
places persons non 8ui juris under disabilities to protect their rights, not to enable
them to invade as assail the rights of others.
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for denying rescission 34 or as subjecting the minor to a countersuit for
damages arising from the deceit.3 5
After all factors are considered, therefore, it would seem to be the
better view that a surgeon should be allowed to introduce evidence as to
an actual consent by a minor, particularly one approaching maturity and
the age of discretion, if not as an absolute defense then at least for the
purpose of providing a mitigating factor to be considered by the jury
when awarding damages. To do otherwise would be to allow a minor to
make a profit from participating in the very tort itself.
J. E. EDMONDSON
AUTOMOBILES-INJURIES FROM OPERATION OR USE OF HIGHWAY-
WHETHER IT IS POSSIBLE TO OBTAIN SUBSTITUTED SERVICE UPON THE PER-
SONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF A DECEASED NoN-RESIDENT AUTOMOBILE OWNER
UNDER A STATUTE PROVIDING FOR SUCH SERVICE UPON A NON-RESIDENT
OWNER OR OPERATOR--The extent to which substituted service may be
utilized in automobile accident cases was put in issue in the recent Ohio
case of In Re Wilcox' Estate.' Therein, a resident of Colorado had been
involved in an automobile accident in Ohio after which he returned home
and died shortly thereafter. The present claimants sought an adjudication
of this matter before an Ohio tribunal and, for this purpose, they at-
tempted to obtain jurisdiction over the personal representative of the
deceased under the so-called substituted service statute.2 The Court of
Appeals of Ohio, in reversing the trial court, held that a statute providing
for substituted service upon a non-resident owner or operator of an auto-
mobile by serving process upon the Secretary of State did not authorize
such service upon the personal representative of one who was subject to
this statute.
Since the adoption in 1908 of the first statute subjecting non-resident
84 Young v. Daniel, 201 Ky. 65, 255 S. W. 854 (1923), noted in 72 U. of Pa. IL
Rev. 450.
35 Berryman v. Highway Trailer Co., 307 Ill. App. 480, 30 N. E. (2d) 761 (1940),
noted In 19 CHICAGo-KENT LAw RLvizw 302.
1 -Ohio App.-, 137 N. E. (2d) 301 (1955).
2 Ohio Rev. Code, 1953, § 2703.20, which provides: "Any non-resident of this state,
being the operator or owner of any motor vehicle who accepts the privilege ex-
tended by the laws of this state to non-resident operators and owners, of operating
a motor vehicle or of having the same operated within this state . . . by such ac-
ceptance or licensure and by the operation of such motor vehicle within this state
makes the secretary of state of the state of Ohio his agent for the service of process
in any civil suit or proceeding instituted In the courts of this state against such
operator or owner of such motor vehicle, arising out of. any accident or collision oc-
curring within this state In which such motor vehicle is involved."
